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Berman: Same-Sex Surrogacy Agreements

BUNDLE OF JOY: WHY SAME-SEX MARRIED COUPLES
HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENTER INTO
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
Benjamin H. Berman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

James and Ryan are a gay couple from New Orleans, Louisiana. They are both forty years old, have been married for five years,
and decide that they are ready to expand their family. The men want
to use a gestational surrogate to have their first child.1 With the help
of a friend, the couple finds Sarah, a healthy, 30-year-old woman
who is also a resident of New Orleans. During an interview, the men
explain to Sarah that James and his lifelong friend Rachel will be the
genetic parents of the couple’s child. Sarah says she would be delighted to help the men embark on their parenthood journey. The
couple and Sarah sign a contract in which the men agree that Sarah
will carry their child to term.2 A few weeks later, an embryo is created and then transferred to Sarah.3
* J.D. Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2021; B.B.A.,
Legal Studies in Business, Hofstra University, 2018. I would like to thank my
grandmother, Carol Berman, my parents, Charles and Lisa Berman, and my siblings, Jeremy Berman and Rebecca and Zach Feller, for their unconditional love
and support through all my law school endeavors. I would also like to thank my
faculty advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz, my Note Editor, Mike Petridis, and the
Touro Law Review staff for helping me produce my best work.
1
Gestational Surrogacy (Surrogate Mother) Definition, THE WOLTERS KLUWER
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (1st ed. 2012). “Gestational Surrogacy”
is defined as “the process by which one woman conceives, carries, and births the
child of another woman or for another person to whom she will give the child after
birth for care, apart from herself.” Id.
2
Legal Aspects of Domestic Gestational Carrier Agreements, RESOLVE,
https://resolve.org/what-are-my-options/surrogacy/legal-aspects-of-domesticgestational-carrier-agreements/ (last visited Sep. 14, 2020) (“[A] gestational carrier
contract is an agreement between intended parents and a gestational carrier and her
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With their plans set in motion, the men decide that they want
to have a local family law attorney, Steven, look over their gestational surrogate contract. When they meet with Steven, he informs them
that their contract is not enforceable under Louisiana state law. Louisiana law bans compensated gestational surrogacy agreements for all
couples.4 In addition, Louisiana only allows those “intended parents”
who would use their own “gametes” to enter into altruistic gestational
surrogacy agreements in the state.5 However, their legal headaches
would not end there. “Pre-birth parentage orders” are limited to the
“intended parents” as defined by the surrogacy statute.6 This means
that neither James nor Ryan would be listed as the child’s parent on
her birth certificate.7 Instead, Sarah alone would be listed as the
child’s mother.8 To establish their legal parentage, the men will be

partner/spouse, if any. These contracts can be compensated or uncompensated and
are intended to detail the parties’ rights, obligations, intentions, and expectations in
connection with their arrangement.”).
3
Dr. Paul C. Magarelli, Embryo Transfer: What It Is, What to Expect, The Different
Types, and More, CNY FERTILITY (Sept. 25, 2020),
https://www.cnyfertility.com/embryo-transfer/ (“An embryo transfer is the final
stage in the In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) process where the fertilized egg—now an
embryo—is placed in the woman’s uterus.”).
4
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718.1 (2016) (“Compensation” means a payment of money,
objects, services, or anything else having monetary value. Compensation shall not
include reimbursement of actual expenses, as provided for in R.S. 9:2720.5(B)(3),
to the gestational carrier or payment for goods or services incurred by the intended
parents as a result of the pregnancy and that would not have been incurred but for
the pregnancy.”); § 9:2720 (C.) (“No person shall enter into a gestational carrier
contract for compensation as defined in R.S. 9:2718.1 or that is not in compliance
with all of the requirements of this Part. Any such contract executed in the state of
Louisiana or any other state shall be absolutely null and unenforceable in the state
of Louisiana as contrary to public policy.”).
5
Id. § 9:2718.1 (2) (“Gamete” means either a sperm or an egg.”); § 9:2718.1 (6)
(“Intended parents” means a married couple who each exclusively contribute their
own gametes to create their embryo and who enter into an enforceable gestational
carrier contract, as defined in this Chapter, with a gestational carrier pursuant to
which the intended parents will be the legal parents of the child resulting from an in
utero embryo transfer.”).
6
The Center for Surrogate Parenting walks you through Louisiana surrogacy law,
LA. SURROGACY L. OVERVIEW, https://www.creatingfamilies.com/us/louisianasurrogacy-law-overview/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
7
Id.
8
Richard Vaughn, Louisiana Surrogacy Bill Advances from Bad to Worse, Int. Fertility L. Group, https://www.iflg.net/louisiana-surrogacy-bill-advances-from-bad-

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/12

2

Berman: Same-Sex Surrogacy Agreements

2021

SAME-SEX SURROGACY AGREEMENTS

831

forced to partake in post-birth adoption proceedings.9 James and
Ryan are outraged by the Louisiana legislature’s decision to make
gestational surrogacy an arduous undertaking for same-sex married
couples in the state. They decide to sue Louisiana in federal court for
violating their constitutional rights. Their claim rests on the fundamental right to raise children, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.10 They also raise a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.11 This Note will argue that
Louisiana’s bans on a same-sex married couple’s ability to enter into
either paid or altruistic surrogacy agreements are unconstitutional.
The fundamental right to raise children should apply with equal force
to same-sex couples who want to start their families by using a gestational surrogate. Gay people should be recognized as a protected
class and laws that discriminate against them on the basis of their
sexual orientation, like Louisiana’s surrogacy statutes, should be held
unenforceable.
Section II of this Note will discuss the different approaches
that states have taken with regard to enforcing gestational surrogacy
agreements. Section III will examine case law concerning a parent’s
rights to the “care, custody, and control of their child” and the application of those rights to a married couple’s decision to use a gestational surrogate. Sections IV and V will discuss the landmark gay
marriage Supreme Court decisions, focusing on how those cases render the disparate treatment of same-sex married couples unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses. Section VI will analyze how a state’s
legalization of gestational surrogacy and adoption of the Uniform
Parentage Act are legislative actions that can effectively safeguard
the rights of married same-sex citizens who choose to use a gestational surrogate. Section VII will address the fundamental right of

to-worse/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2020) (explaining that “[t]he surrogate is deemed
the legal mother of the child, and the intended mother has no parental rights, even
though the embryo may be the biological child of the intended mother and intended
father.”).
9
The Center for Surrogate Parenting walks you through Louisiana surrogacy law,
supra note 6.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. art. XIV, § 1.
11
Id.
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same-sex married couples to enter into gestational surrogacy agreements under the United States Constitution.
II.

LEGALITY OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY

Gestational surrogacy is governed by state law.12 There are
three categories used to identify the likelihood of the state enforcing a
gestational surrogacy contract.13 The three categories are “surrogacyfriendly,” “surrogacy-unfriendly,” and surrogacy neutral.14 A state is
viewed as surrogacy neutral when neither its statutes nor its caselaw
makes clear whether a gestational surrogacy agreement would be enforced.15
“Surrogacy-friendly” jurisdictions explicitly permit gestational surrogacy contracts and protect the rights of both the intended parents and the gestational surrogate.16 Illinois’ surrogacy laws, for example, deem that the intended parent of a child born from a
gestational surrogate is the legal parent of the child immediately upon
the child’s birth.17 The purpose of establishing the intended parent’s
pre-birth contractual parentage rights in a contract is to prevent a gestational surrogate from asserting a custody claim once the child is
born.18 Illinois law requires that a gestational surrogate understand
her role as a mere carrier in the process by mandating that she obtain
legal counsel for the agreement to be enforced.19
A “surrogacy-unfriendly” state is a state that denies the enforceability of gestational surrogacy agreements.20 Michigan has de12

Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM,
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legalinformation/surrogacy-laws-by-state/ (last visited Sep. 27, 2020).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
2003 ILL. HB 4962 § 15 (a) (2) (2005). “The intended father shall be the father
of the child for purposes of State law immediately upon the birth of the child.” Id.
18
Id. § 15 (a) (5). (“Sole custody of the child shall rest with the intended parent or
parents immediately upon the birth of the child.”).
19
Id. § 20 (a) (5). (“She has undergone legal consultation with independent legal
counsel regarding the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract and the potential
legal consequences of the gestational surrogacy.”).
20
Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, supra note 12.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/12

4

Berman: Same-Sex Surrogacy Agreements

2021

SAME-SEX SURROGACY AGREEMENTS

833

termined that gestational surrogacy contracts violate state public policy.21 Currently, Michigan is the only state that falls into this category.22
Surrogacy-neutral states do not clearly define what, if any,
protections are afforded to intended parents and gestational surrogates in the state.23 While there are no gestational surrogacy laws in
Kentucky, for example, an intended parent in the state may still obtain a pre-birth order if they are biologically related to the child.24
Louisiana is another example of a state that has permitted surrogacy
only under limited circumstances.25 These circumstances include
when the agreement is altruistic in nature and the intended parents are
a married opposite-sex couple.26
III.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE “CARE, CUSTODY,
AND CONTROL” OF A CHILD BY A PARENT
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Case Law

In Troxel v. Granville,27 the Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the “care,
custody, and control of their children.”28 The case involved an unmarried couple, Brad Troxel and Tommie Granville, who had two
daughters together.29 Brad and Tommie later separated but their
children continued to have a relationship with Brad’s parents, Gary
and Jennifer Troxel.30 Brad committed suicide and Tommie sought
to limit her daughters’ time with their paternal grandparents.31 The
Troxels responded by filing a visitation petition with the Washington
21

MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.855 § (5) (LexisNexis 2020).
Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, supra note 12. The law in New York
recently changed and it is no longer a surrogacy-unfriendly state.
23
Id.
24
Surrogacy Laws by State, LPG, https://connect.asrm.org/lpg/resources/surrogacyby-state?ssopc=1, (last visited Sep. 27, 2020).
25
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720.1 (C.) (2016).
26
Id.
27
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
28
Id. at 66
29
Id. at 60.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 60-61.
22
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Superior Court, that was later granted by the Washington Supreme
Court.32 The basis for the Troxels’ petition was a Washington statute.33 When Tommie appealed, the Washington Supreme Court
found that the Troxels should not have been granted visitation
rights.34 The court rested its decision on the Federal Constitution.35
The Supreme Court granted the Troxels’ petition for certiorari.36
The United States Supreme Court reviewed whether granting
the Troxels’ visitation under the Washington statute would violate
Tommie’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.37 The Court
addressed this issue through its application of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.38 The Court noted that this substantive component “provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”39
Tommie’s liberty interest here was the “care, custody, and control” of
her children.40 Based on long-standing precedent, the Court determined that, under the Due Process Clause, this liberty interest applies
to two important facets of the parent-child relationship.41 The first is
a parent’s right to “establish a home and bring up children.”42 The
second is a parent’s right to “control the education of their own [children].”43 Essentially, both of these rights protect a parent’s ability to
preside over the upbringing of their children.44 The Court reasoned
that the Washington statute at issue infringed on the fundamental
right of parents to raise their own children.45 The statute was unconstitutional because it was “breathtakingly broad.”46 The law gave
32

Id.
Id. (“[A]ny person [may] petition the court for visitation rights at any time.”) (citing Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 26.10.160(3) (1994))).
34
Id. at 63.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 65.
38
Id.
39
Id. (quoting Wash v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
43
Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 67.
46
Id.
33
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sweeping authority to third-parties to assert visitation claims.47 Further, once a claim was asserted, Washington state judges had the authority to subvert a parent’s will by ruling in favor of the visitation
claim.48
The Court determined that the Superior Court erred in granting the Troxels’ visitation petition under the statute.49 Finding a lack
of “special factors” to warrant the State’s involvement in Tommie’s
child- rearing choices, the Court noted that Tommie was a fit parent
whose parentage decisions should have been afforded the presumption of being in her children’s best interests.50 The Superior Court
incorrectly looked to the children’s best interest by forcing Tommie
to disprove that “visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters.”51 Finally, the Court pointed out that Tommie did not intend to
entirely exclude her children’s paternal grandparents from their
lives.52 The fact that Tommie agreed to “one day of visitation per
month” proved to the Court that her proposal should have been reasonable to the Superior Court.53 Tommie made this decision based
on what she believed was right for her children.54 Considering these
factors, the Court determined that enforcing the statute violated
Tommie’s constitutionally protected parental decision to limit the
Troxels’ visitation.55 The Court thus affirmed the Washington Supreme Court’s decision.56
B.

State Court Case Law

P.M. v. T.B.57 is an Iowa case that also applied Troxel’s principles of parentage rights to gestational surrogacy agreements.58 This
case involved P.M. and C.M., a married couple who had children
47

Id.
Id.
49
Id. at 68.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 69.
52
Id. at 71.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 72.
55
Id. at 75.
56
Id.
57
907 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 2018).
58
See id.
48
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from a prior marriage.59 The couple decided that they wanted to have
their own baby together through gestational surrogacy since C.M.
could no longer conceive.60 They advertised on Craigslist seeking a
surrogate.61 T.B. and her husband D.B. responded to the advertisement and set up a meeting with the Ms.62 The couples got along well
in the beginning and came to an agreement that T.B. would “gestate
two embryos fertilized in vitro with P.M.’s sperm and the eggs of an
anonymous donor.”63 The contract stated that the Ms would adopt
one of the babies in exchange for the Ms agreeing to pay for T.B.’s in
vitro fertilization (IVF) procedure and her prenatal expenses.64 However, the relationship between the Ms and the Bs later deteriorated
and communications between the parties stopped almost entirely.65
T.B. lost one of the babies after childbirth and decided that she wanted to keep the other baby, Baby H.66 Although they were not informed about the birth, the Ms suspected that the childbirth had occurred and two months later, “filed a motion for an emergency ex
parte injunction.”67 The district court ruled that the surrogacy agreement was enforceable and that the Ms were therefore Baby H’s parents.68
The Iowa Supreme Court decided whether the enforcement of
the surrogacy contract violated T.B.’s rights under the United States
Constitution.69 The court noted that the Iowa legislature had affirmed
its legislative stance that neither traditional nor gestational surrogacy
agreements violated state law.70 The court also pointed out that gestational surrogacy agreements in the state are presumed valid under
the law.71 It was then determined by the court that the surrogacy
agreement between the Ms and the Bs did not violate a state criminal
59

Id. at 525.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 526.
65
Id. at 527.
66
Id. at 528.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 529.
69
Id. at 530.
70
Id. at 533.
71
Id. at 535.
60
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statute that banned the sale of babies.72 The Ms did not violate the
statute because they were paying T.B. for her services as a gestational
carrier, and were not selling the baby.73 The court found that P.M.
was the legal parent of Baby H because the surrogacy agreement was
enforceable.74 The court reasoned that constitutional rights vested in
the “biological and intended” parent of Baby H, and that no such
rights should be conferred upon Baby H’s gestational carrier.75 Thus,
the court determined that “P.M.'s undisputed status as the biological
and intended father of Baby H” trumped any constitutional rights
T.B. had over Baby H.76 The court therefore held that the Ms were
the legal parents of Baby H.77
Troxel reaffirmed that a parent’s ability to choose how to provide for the “care, custody, and control of their children” is the cornerstone of the substantive due process rights to make familial decisions.78 The Iowa Supreme Court in P.M. v. T.B. expanded on this
foundation by providing that gestational surrogacy agreements are
enforceable in Iowa.79 Substantive due process rights therefore
should include entrusting intended parents, who are to be the unborn
child’s legal parents, with the authority to make parental decisions on
behalf of their unborn child.
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHTS OF SAME-SEX
MARRIED COUPLES
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Case Law

In Obergefell v. Hodges,80 the Supreme Court reviewed numerous state court cases that banned same-sex marriage.81 The Court
decided two issues. The first issue was whether the Fourteenth
Amendment mandated that, upon request, states must issue same-sex
72

Id. at 536.
Id.
74
Id. at 543.
75
Id. at 542.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 543.
78
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000).
79
T.B., 907 N.W.2d at 543.
80
576 U.S. 644 (2015).
81
See id.
73
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couples marriage licenses.82 The second issue was whether, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, states that had not yet legalized same-sex
marriage were required to affirm the validity of same-sex marriage
licenses provided by the states that recognized same-sex marriage.83
These issues implicated both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 The Due Process Clause
will be discussed in this section. The Equal Protection Clause will be
discussed in the next section.
The Court reasoned that four principles of opposite-sex marriage applied with “equal force to same-sex marriage.”85 These four
principles show that marriage is a fundamental right that should apply
to same-sex couples.86 The first principle discussed is the importance
of a person’s ability to choose whom he wants to marry. 87 The Court
noted that this decision is one of the most intimate decisions a person
can make, comparing it to “choices concerning contraception, family
relationships, procreation, and childrearing.”88 The Court reasoned
that the intimate nature of the decision entitled same-sex couples to
the same dignity and respect as opposite-sex married couples.89 The
second principle analyzed is the support provided by the institution of
marriage to two committed people.90 The Court suggested that marriage helps to assuage fears that no one will be there to care for them
in their old age through offering the “hope of companionship.”91
Such companionship, in the Court’s view, should not be denied to
same-sex couples who deserve “the full promise of liberty” in their
intimate associations.92
The third principle is the role of marriage in protecting the
rights of children and families and “draws meaning from related

82

Id. at 656.
Id.
84
Id. at 675.
85
Id. at 665.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 666.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 667.
92
Id.
83
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rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”93 The Court
adeptly pointed out that, at the time of the oral argument in Obergefell, “hundreds of thousands of children” were being brought up by
same-sex couples.94 The children of these couples stood to benefit
from the stability that a marriage relationship would give their parents.95 And finally, the fourth principle is the notion that “marriage is
a keystone of our social order.”96 The Court emphasized that marriage helps to promote the well-being of our society.97 States have
long been encouraging marital unions by linking rights exclusively to
them.98 It was therefore unfair in the Court’s view for states to deny
same-sex couples the opportunity to experience these benefits
through their own unions.99 At the conclusion of his opinion, Justice
Kennedy expressed his view on why it was essential for same-sex
couples to be able to fully enjoy the institution of marriage in the
United States of America.100 In the Justice’s eyes, “[n]o union is
more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”101
The Court determined that banning same-sex marriage was
unlawful because the four principles and traditions of marriage apply
equally to couples in same-sex unions.102 The Court thus held that
same-sex marriage was a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.103
B.

State Court Case Law

In 2019, the Utah Supreme Court relied on Obergefell when
addressing the issue of whether a married same-sex couple’s gestational surrogacy agreement was enforceable. In In re Gestational

93

Id.
Id. at 668.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 669.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 670.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 681.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 670.
103
Id. at 681.
94
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Agreement,104 N.T.B. and J.G.M., a “married same-sex male couple,” entered into a gestational surrogacy contract with D.B. and
G.M., an “opposite-sex married couple.”105 The couples asked the
Utah district court to validate their agreement, but the court refused.106 At issue was section 78B-15-803 of the Utah Code which
limited the enforcement of gestational surrogacy agreements to situations where “medical evidence shows that the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to do so without unreasonable risk to
her physical or mental health or to the unborn child.”107 The district
court reasoned that “the word ‘mother’ and ‘her’ plainly refer to a
woman.”108 The court concluded that since neither of the child’s intended parents was a woman, the agreement between the parties violated Utah law.109
The Utah Supreme Court considered whether the state statute
that limited gestational surrogacy to opposite-sex couples was constitutional.110 The court reasoned that the benefit of gestational surrogacy could not be enjoyed by same-sex couples in the state due to the
statute.111 As a result, the court noted that the statute was effectively
denying these couples from being able to participate in a right that
was explicitly linked to marriage.112 However, this was not just an
ordinary right, but a right that the court pointed out is “one of the
most important benefits afforded to couples who may not be medically capable of having a biological child.”113 The court decided that the
“intended mother provision” of the statute violated the “due process
rights” guaranteed to same-sex married couples by the Federal Constitution.114
Obergefell ensures that married same-sex couples are not prevented from enjoying any of the benefits that the state links exclu104

2019 UT 40, ¶ 1, 449 P.3d 69 (Utah 2019).
Id. at 73.
106
Id.
107
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-803 (LexisNexis 2020).
108
In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, 73.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 74.
111
Id. at 80 (explaining that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-803 (2020) violated Obergefell).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 82.
114
Id.
105
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sively to marriage. The reasoning in those cases applies to the gestational surrogacy agreements that Louisiana has rendered available
exclusively to opposite-sex married couples. Excluding same-sex
married couples like James and Ryan from gestational surrogacy
agreements is both unconstitutional and unfair. This position was reflected in the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gestational
Agreement.

V.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHTS OF SAME-SEX
MARRIED COUPLES
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Case Law

In Pavan v. Smith,115 the Supreme Court affirmed its holding
in Obergefell, maintaining that all married couples must be treated
the same under the law.116 Pavan involved two married same-sex
couples from Arkansas where one of each of the partners had given
birth to a child through artificial insemination.117 The couples had
each requested birth certificates that would list the names of both
partners as their child’s parents.118 However, the Arkansas Department of Health (“Department”) issued these couples birth certificates
that contained only the name of the birth mother.119 The Department
argued that it was following an Arkansas statute which stated that a
birth certificate was exclusively meant to contain the names of a birth
mother and her husband.120 The couples sued the Department, arguing that the statute violated the Constitution.121 The Arkansas Supreme Court found for the Department, upholding the constitutionality of the statute.122
The United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
reasoned that the Arkansas statute was inconsistent with Obergefell
115

137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam).
See id.
117
Id. at 2077.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
116
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because “it denied married same-sex couples access to ‘the constellation of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s] linked to marriage.’”123 The
Court also acknowledged the import of accurate birth certificates
since the document is often used by parents for the purposes of making decisions related to their child’s health and schooling.124 By
providing defective birth certificates, the Arkansas statute compromised the “rights, benefits, and responsibilities” of same-sex married
couples.”125 Thus, the Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
judgment on equal protection grounds.126
B.

State Court Case Law

The Maryland case In re Roberto D.B.127 concerned the enforceability of a state statute that prevented a biological father from
being listed as the father on his children’s birth certificates.128 The
biological father, Roberto D.B., utilized in vitro fertilization (IVF)
with “his sperm being used to fertilize eggs from an anonymous egg
donor.”129 Two fertilized eggs were produced as a result of the procedure.130 Roberto contracted with a woman to act as a gestational
carrier.131 On August 23, 2001, the carrier gave birth to twins.132 In
Maryland, “[t]he medical records department of a hospital is required
to submit information regarding births to the Maryland Division of
Vital Records (“MDVR”), a part of the Maryland Vital Statistics
Administration.”133 The MDVR then issues certificates of birth
based on the information it receives from the hospital.134 It was hospital policy to “report the gestational carrier as the ‘mother’ of the

123

Id. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015)) (alteration
in original).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007).
128
See id. at 117; see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208 (LexisNexis
2021).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208(a)(4)(iii).).
134
Id. at 118.
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child to the MDVR.”135 The hospital where the carrier gave birth,
Holy Cross Hospital, complied with this policy and reported Roberto’s carrier as the mother.136 Roberto and the carrier, however, did
not want the carrier to be listed as the children’s mother.137 The carrier was not genetically related to the children and she did not want a
legal parentage relationship to be established between herself and the
children.138
The two parties joined in a “petition to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County” to declare Roberto the legal father of the children.139 Additionally, they wanted the hospital to report just the father’s name to the MDVR so that he could obtain accurate birth certificates for his children.140 The circuit court denied the petition and
refused to change the birth certificates.141 The parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.142
The issue before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether
the paternity statute “afforded equal protection of the law to men and
women similarly situated” under the Maryland Equal Rights
Amendment.143 Under the law, men were able to deny paternity but
women were not able to deny maternity.144 This meant that a gestational surrogate, such as Roberto’s carrier, could not deny legal parentage of the child she carried despite having no genetic connection
to the child.145 The court reasoned that, at the time the paternity statute was written, the legislature could not have anticipated the commonplace use of assisted reproductive technologies to have children.146 The court reasoned that the statute on its face could be
“[i]nterpret[ed] . . . to extend the same rights to women and maternity

135

Id.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 120 (“[E]quality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied
because of sex.”) (citing Md. Dec. of R. art. 46 (1972))).
144
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 122.
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as it applies - and works quite well - to men and paternity.”147 In
reaching its decision, the court also noted the lack of competing parenting interests in this case.148 The court explained that because
Roberto was a fit parent, there was no reason to deny him the relief
he wanted.149 The court thus reversed the Circuit Court of Montgomery County’s judgment.150
Under Pavan, it is unconstitutional for Louisiana to refuse to
issue James and Ryan a birth certificate with their names listed as the
parents of their child. Louisiana is violating the rights guaranteed by
the Equal Protection Clause by treating married same-sex couples
differently from married opposite-sex couples. In order to rectify the
issue, Louisiana must amend its gestational surrogacy statutes, following the holding articulated by the Maryland court in In re Roberto
D.B. when it recognized that the child’s intended parent should be the
child’s legal parent.151 The new Louisiana statutes must include
same-sex couples in the definition of “intended parents,” which
would then legally permit same-sex couples to enter into gestational
surrogacy agreements.
C.

The Equal Protection Clause Test

When a claim is brought under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must first show that the statute at controversy is either discriminatory on its face or is facially
neutral but has a discriminatory effect and was passed with a discriminatory intent.152 By proving discrimination, the plaintiff establishes
a classification.153 Suspect classification typically includes race, religion, or national origin.154 Quasi-suspect classification generally in147

Id. at 125.
Id. at 130.
149
Id. at 131.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Cassidy Heiserman, Punishing Indigency: Why Cash Bail is Unconstitutional
Under the Equal Protection Clause, DREXEL L. REV.: BLOG (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://drexel.edu/law/lawreview/blog/overview/2020/September/cash-bail/.
153
Id.
154
Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, UMCK.EDU,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2021).
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cludes gender or sex.155 Non-suspect classification is everything else,
including age, wealth, or disability.156
Next, based on the discrimination, the court will determine
what level of scrutiny should apply.157 Strict scrutiny applies to statutes that affect suspect classes.158 In order to pass strict scrutiny, the
government defendant must show that the statute achieves a compelling purpose and that no non-discriminatory alternatives exist.159 The
factors that determine suspect classification of a group include the
immutability of the trait that leads to classification, the political power of the group, the existence of a history of discrimination against
the group, and whether prejudice continues to hold the group back
from progress.160
Intermediate scrutiny applies to statutes that affect quasisuspect classes.161 The statute at controversy passes intermediate
scrutiny when the government defendant can show that the statute accomplishes an important purpose and that the purpose can be
achieved only through compliance with the statute.162
Rational basis applies to statutes that affect non-suspect classes.
The rational basis test requires that the plaintiff prove that the
statute at controversy is not “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”164 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has been inclined to apply a heightened rational basis review, known as rational
basis “with a bite,” to cases that involve discrimination against the
gay community.165 Under this theory, the Supreme Court has found
163
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Id.
Id.
157
Heiserman, supra note 152.
158
Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 154.
159
Heiserman, supra note 152.
160
Suspect Classification, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
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Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 154.
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Heiserman, supra note 152.
163
Id.
164
Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scrutiny’s Compelling- and Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1406 (2016).
165
Rational Basis Test with Bite, UMCK.EDU,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rationalbasiswbite.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2021).
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that state statutes intended to harm gays never serve a “legitimate
governmental interest” and are therefore unenforceable.166
VI.

STATE LEGALIZATION OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
AGREEMENTS
A.

Uniform Parentage Act

The Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) is a law adopted in 1973
by all the states to create “a way for the courts to identify a child’s
legal parents, regardless of marital status.”167 In 2002, the UPA was
revised to recognize gestational surrogacy agreements.168 Following
Obergefell, the UPA was again modified in 2017.169 One of the new
provisions “add[ed] a rule for the states to establish a de facto parental status of a legal parent who is not biologically related to the
child.”170 The goal of updating the UPA was to protect the interests
of children who are members of modern families.171 States are not
required to adopt the UPA’s revisions.172

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). “If the constitutional conception of
“equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.” Id. at 634 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534). United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government . . . In
determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose,
“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’” especially require careful consideration.” Id. at 769-770 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633).
167
Melissa Heinig, What Is the Legal Definition of a Parent Under the Uniform
Parentage Act?, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.lawyers.com/legalinfo/family-law/paternity/legal-definition-parent-under-uniform-parentage-act.html.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. The states that have adopted the 2017 provision include California, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington. The 2017 provision has been introduced in the
Connecticut, Maine, and Pennsylvania legislatures. 2017 Parentage Act, UNIF. L.
COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Feb.
27, 2021).
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Across the country, advocates for gestational surrogacy have
been fighting passionately for states to reform their antiquated parentage laws to ensure equality for all married couples.173 The advocates’ efforts have focused on lobbying states both to legalize gestational surrogacy agreements and to codify the vesting of legal
parentage rights for intended parents, regardless of a parent’s sexual
orientation.174 As a direct result of this push, Rhode Island decided it
was time to embrace the UPA’s revisions by adopting The Rhode Island Parentage Act in January 2021.175 This law allows any married
couple who intends to have a child through the use of a gestational
surrogate to be able to obtain a parentage order.176 A parentage order
states who the intended parents are with an affirmation that all parentage rights will vest exclusively in the intended parents when the
child is born.177 Prior to the Rhode Island Parentage Act, state law
made it cumbersome for intended parents who were not the biological
parents of their children to establish their legal parentage.178 Now,
the legal parentage process has been revised for the first time in forty
years to reflect the paradigm shift that families can take on various
forms.179 On the adoption of the Act, United States Secretary of
Commerce and former Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo stated
that “[n]o parent should have to jump through hoops to receive legal
recognition because of their sexual orientation or the circumstances
of their child's birth. The Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act enshrines into law our belief in the validity of all paths to
parenthood.”180
173

Bethany Bump, Advocates call for New York to Legalize Gestational Surrogacy,
TIMES UNION (Mar. 6, 2019) https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Advocatescall-for-New-York-to-legalize-13667032.php (“More than three dozen states have
legalized the practice.”). Gestational surrogacy agreements are legal in New York
as of February 2021. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 5-C (Consol. 2021).
174
Bump, supra note 173.
175
Press Release, State of Rhode Island Gen. Assembly, Rhode Island Parentage
Act signed into law, (July 21, 2020),
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/pressrelease/_layouts/RIL.PressRelease.ListStructure/Fo
rms/DisplayForm.aspx?List=c8baae31-3c10-431c-8dcd9dbbe21ce3e9&ID=371007.
176
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-708 (2020).
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Id.
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See Press Release, State of Rhode Island Gen. Assembly, supra note 175.
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Id.
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Other State Legislative Action

New York has also recently taken a stance towards expanding
equality for same-sex married couples in the state, as evidenced by its
adoption of the Child-Parent Security (“Act”).181 The law was passed
in April, 2020 and went into effect on February 15, 2021.182 The Act
legalizes both altruistic and paid gestational surrogacy agreements
while putting protections in place to safeguard the rights of the gestational surrogate herself.183 Further, the Act seeks to help intended
parents more easily establish their legal parentage rights.184 The parentage rights are established by eliminating the requirement for adoption proceedings, installing a mandate that gestational surrogates relinquish any parentage claims, and “establishing the legal rights of
children born via assisted reproduction.”185 New York’s reform is
monumental because it breaks down many of the barriers that
LGBTQ+ individuals and couples have faced when they wanted to
start a family in the state.186 Previously, gestational surrogacy
agreements were banned in the state as they violated the law.187
Governor Andrew Cuomo proclaimed in his 2020 State of the State
that New York’s ban on gestational surrogacy was “based in fear not
love.”188 He conveyed his belief that it is “past time New York help
LGBTQ+ couples and people struggling with fertility use commonplace reproductive technology to start families.”189
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Harriet Newman Cohen & Tim James, Surrogacy Agreements Approved by New
York...With Provisions, LAW.COM (July 24, 2020, 3:00 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/07/24/surrogacy-agreementsapproved-by-new-york-with-provisos/?slreturn=20200925192824; see also N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 5-C (Consol. 2021).
182
Cohen & James, supra note 181.
183
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
188
Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Unveils 16th
Proposal of 2020 State of the State: Legalizing Gestational Surrogacy, (Dec. 30,
2019),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-unveils-16th-proposal-2020state-state-legalizing-gestational-surrogacy.
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Id.
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ANALYSIS
A.

James and Ryan Have a Constitutional Right to
Enter into A Gestational Surrogacy Agreement in
Louisiana Under the Substantive Due Process
Clause

Under Troxel, James and Ryan have the constitutional rights
as fit intended parents to make decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control of their child.”190 As a result, it should fall within
their rights to make one of the most fundamental of all parentage decisions, deciding how their child will be carried to term. Louisiana
should thus recognize the use of a gestational surrogate by a samesex married couple as a legitimate exercise of parental authority by
the intended parents.
Further, James will be the biological father of the child in addition to being an intended parent with Ryan. In P.M. v. T.B., the
Iowa Supreme Court determined that a biological parent’s rights over
his child are paramount and will trump any third-party parentage
claims.191 This principle supports the notion that James, who is having a child that will be genetically related to him, should be given
control to decide the way his child is to be carried to term.
The defining principle of the landmark gay marriage decisions
is that all married couples must be able to enjoy the same benefits
that the institution of marriage provides. The right to enter into a gestational surrogacy agreement as a married intended parent is a fundamental liberty interest because it concerns the family unit. Louisiana’s surrogacy laws fail to guarantee due process of law for all
married couples in the state. The “gametes” language contained in
the statute implies that only opposite-sex married couples may use an
altruistic gestational surrogate. This is inconsistent with all the traditions and principles of marriage that the Court in Obergefell found
apply with equal force to same-sex marriage. First, it interferes with
a person’s right to choose whom to marry.192 Marriage, as Justice
Kennedy pointed out, is often used as a building block to establish a
190

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000).
P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 543 (Iowa 2018).
192
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015).
191
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family with the person one loves.193 Thus, by denying same-sex married couples the ability to use an altruistic gestational surrogate, Louisiana is wrongfully devaluing the marriage relationship between two
persons of the same sex. As the laws are written, same-sex married
couples are restricted from starting a family, unlike opposite-sex married couples. Next, the laws deny same-sex married couples “full
liberty” because it treats their marriages as lesser than those marriages between opposite-sex couples. Third, the laws harm the interests
of children because it makes it harder for same-sex parents to establish their rights as the legal parents of their children. Legal parentage
is essential for a parent to make all the most important childrearing
decisions, including schooling and healthcare. And finally, the laws
deny those benefits to same-sex married couples that the state has explicitly linked to marriage.
Louisiana’s unlawful ban on same-sex married couples’ use
of a gestational surrogate is similar to the Utah surrogacy statute that
the Utah Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in In re Gestational Agreement.194 Both statutes have terms that imply that the rights
contained within the statute only apply to opposite-sex couples: the
obscure “gametes” language in Louisiana limiting who the “intended
parents” can be and the term “intended mother” in Utah. When the
legality of a surrogacy agreement is conditioned on marriage, as the
Utah Supreme Court noted, it is categorically unfair for the law to
exclude same-sex married couples.
B.

James and Ryan Have a Constitutional Right to
Enter into A Gestational Surrogacy Agreement in
Louisiana Under the Equal Protection Clause

Louisiana’s surrogacy laws discriminate against James and
Ryan on the basis of their sexual orientation. The statutes place a biological restriction on who can enter into gestational surrogacy
agreements in the state. The laws punish James and Ryan as a married same-sex couple because they are biologically unable to provide
their own “sperm” and “egg.” Because the laws therefore implicitly
limit gestational surrogacy to married opposite-sex couples, James

193
194

Id. at 681.
See supra Section IV.B.
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and Ryan can successfully assert that the laws are discriminatory on
their face.
Sexual orientation is an immutable trait.195 Although sexual
orientation, unlike race, cannot be perceived visually, people who are
gay have a trait that is distinguishable from that of the general population.196 This trait is their attraction to members of the same-sex.197
Because all gay individuals thus have a defining characteristic, as opposed to other groups, such as close relatives, they are a discrete
group with an immutable trait.198 Recent developments show that the
gay community has made strides towards increasing its political influence in the country. For example, in February 2021, the United
States Senate confirmed the first openly gay presidential cabinet appointee, Pete Buttigieg.199 However, the gay community’s lobbying
power over government is still miniscule and far more rudimentary in
comparison to corporate forces.200 Gays’ “struggle is not for special
tax exemptions, but rather for simple human dignity.”201 Even with
the successes of marriage equality and representation in government,
the furtherance of basic equality alone does not equate to substantial
political power on the part of the gay community.202 A primary reason for the curtailment of the gay community’s progress is the history
of discrimination that the community has faced. Over the years, gays
have suffered “numerous grisly hate crimes and deplorable employ-

195

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, THE HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminologyand-definitions (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
196
Brett Parker, What Level of Legal Scrutiny Should Sexual Orientation-Based
Classifications Receive?, STANFORD POL. (Jan. 19, 2015),
https://stanfordpolitics.org/2015/01/19/level-legal-scrutiny-sexual-orientationclassifications/.
197
Id.
198
Id.; see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (“Close relatives… do not exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group.”).
199
Oliver O’Connell, Pete Buttigieg becomes first gay cabinet member confirmed
by Senate in historic vote, THE INDEP. (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/pete-buttigiegopenly-gay-cabinet-member-senate-b1796535.html.
200
Parker, supra note 196.
201
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202
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ment injustices.”203 In addition, the gay community has been victimized by legislation such as bans on same-sex marriage and “openly
serving in the military.”204 Discriminatory acts taken against the gay
community have been fueled by prejudice. There exists no societal
necessity to treat the gay community differently from any other.205
The anti-gay movement therefore falls back on hateful stereotypes
regarding the “immorality of homosexuality.”206 These moral prejudices still run rampant in certain influential circles, hurting the ongoing struggle for gay rights and equality.207 For these reasons, sexual
orientation should be classified as a suspect class.208
Because James and Ryan should be considered members of a
suspect class, strict scrutiny should apply against Louisiana’s gestational surrogacy laws. Under strict scrutiny, Louisiana would have to
prove that its gestational surrogacy statutes achieve a compelling
purpose and that no non-discriminatory alternatives exist. Louisiana
would fail at demonstrating a compelling purpose. The state would
likely argue that the statutes should be enforced as written because
they help to promote the traditional family unit and the children’s
well-being. This is not a compelling state interest because the Supreme Court reiterated in Pavan the notion that such moral arguments
do not affect the law. Louisiana must recognize that the Federal
Constitution protects married couples from being barred from the
benefits of marriage on the basis of sexual orientation. The state has
linked gestational surrogacy to marriage and cannot therefore deny
203

Id.
Id. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which allowed for the discharge of outed gay servicemembers, was repealed on December 22, 2010. Ali Rogin, How Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell has affected LGBTQ service members, 10 years after repeal, PBS (Dec.
22, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-dont-ask-dont-tell-hasaffected-lgbtq-service-members-10-years-after-repeal.
205
Id.
206
Id.
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Evelyn Schlatter, 18 Anti-Gay Groups and Their Propaganda, THE S. POVERTY
L. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligencereport/2010/18-anti-gay-groups-and-their-propaganda. (“These groups’ influence
reaches far beyond what their size would suggest, because the “facts” they disseminate about homosexuality are often amplified by certain politicians, other groups
and even news organizations.”).
208
The standards for sexual orientation and gender should be the same. Gender
should also be considered a suspect classification based on immutable characteristics.
204
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access to this form of procreation to same-sex married couples for a
non-compelling reason. A feasible non-discriminatory alternative also exists. Louisiana merely has to change its surrogacy statutes to
clearly reflect that all married couples may use a gestational surrogate. Because Louisiana lacks a compelling purpose and has a nondiscriminatory alternative, its surrogacy laws do not survive strict
scrutiny.209
Currently, the Supreme Court does not recognize sexual orientation as a suspect class.210 However, under the current standard,
which is rational basis review “with a bite,” the statutes still fail.211
The statutes fail because they can be classified as anti-gay legislation.
They were passed to deny gay couples their dignity to start their
family with the person they love. Such “animus” does nothing to further a legitimate interest of the state.212 Instead, the hostility perpetuated by the statutes merely serves to hinder the progress of same-sex
couples being treated the same as opposite-sex couples by society.
There is thus no rational basis for Louisiana’s surrogacy statutes.213
The Louisiana statutes present an additional dilemma by preventing the same-sex parents of a child born from gestational surrogacy from being listed as the child’s parents on her birth certificate.
The state should look to the holding of the Maryland case In re Roberto D.B. by not creating a parentage dispute between an intended
parent and a gestational carrier when an issue between the parties did
not exist in the first place. Just like the carrier in Roberto, Sarah does
not want to be listed as the mother of James’s and Ryan’s child.
Thus, when there is no parentage dispute in a gestational surrogacy
situation, Louisiana should list the intended same-sex parents on their
children’s birth certificates as they would for opposite-sex parents.
This would drastically smooth the process of establishing legal par-

209

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
Parker, supra note 196.
211
Rational Basis Test with Bite, supra note 165.
212
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). “Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies,
even this conventional inquiry… Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.” Id.
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576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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entage and will give same-sex parents the ease of mind they need
when their child is born.
C.

Louisiana Should Adopt the Uniform Parentage
Act

In addition to reforming its gestational surrogacy statutes,
Louisiana should adopt the 2017 provision of the Uniform Parentage
Act. The current surrogacy laws show that the state is not yet on the
path to accepting same-sex married couples as equal to opposite-sex
married couples. As discussed, this presents a major problem for
same-sex married couples who wish to have children and exercise
their right to have a family. Adopting the revised Uniform Parentage
Act would transform Louisiana’s current approach by ensuring the
protection of the fundamental rights of its LGBTQ+ citizens on the
state level. It thus behooves Louisiana to adopt policies that encourage acceptance and equal treatment over exclusion and rejection.

D.

Congress Should Pass Legislation to Establish A
National Framework for Uniform Access to
Gestational Surrogacy

In her Article in the UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy, Michelle Elizabeth Holland suggests that “[f]ederal law addressing gestational surrogacy should also be established in order to protect individuals from states that seek to limit or outlaw gestational
surrogacy.”214 Federal regulation of gestational surrogacy would be
beneficial as it could remove the limitations that certain “surrogacy
neutral” and “surrogacy unfriendly” jurisdictions, including Louisiana, have put in place to gatekeep the process. Congress could require that gestational surrogacy be available to both opposite-sex and
same-sex married couples “while providing states the opportunity to
regulate its practice as they see fit.”215 For instance, the states should
still be able to control whether the agreements can be altruistic, paid,
214

Michelle E. Holland, Article, Forbidding Gestational Surrogacy: Impeding the
Fundamental Right to Procreate, 17 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 1, 26 (2013).
215
Id. at 26-27.
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or if either option is permitted. This approach represents the best solution to the problem because it ensures that protections are codified
on the federal level for intended same-sex parents while still respecting state sovereignty.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ability for James and Ryan to enter into a gestational surrogacy agreement in Louisiana is protected by the Substantive Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that substantive due
process protects a parent’s right to make decisions for their children.
This right extends to unborn children because even a child that is not
born can have at least one intended parent who is biologically related
to her, like James. Courts have given such intended parents the right
to make decisions on the unborn child’s behalf. Equal protection
demands that same-sex and opposite-sex married couples are treated
the same under the law. Louisiana’s surrogacy statute violates this
right by precluding same-sex married couples from using a gestational surrogate. It is therefore necessary for the state to reform its surrogacy laws so that it can pass constitutional muster and finally recognize same-sex married couples’ rights under the United States
Constitution.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

27

